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Abstract 
In this survey, we describe the current state of corporate governance in Russia and discuss its 
dynamics and prospects. We review the main mechanisms of corporate governance in the 
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1. Introduction 
 
In this survey we describe the current state of corporate governance in Russia and discuss 
its dynamics and prospects. Corporate governance has become an important topic in Russia 
once again, and there is a clear trend among the largest Russian companies to adhere to good 
corporate governance standards by increasing disclosure, complying with international 
accounting standards, placing “independent directors” on boards, and adopting corporate 
governance codes, for example. 
There have also been initiatives to improve corporate governance from the government, 
regulators and various private agencies. The government is adopting new laws and 
amendments to the existing laws. The Federal Financial Markets Service (formerly the 
Federal Commission for Securities Markets) introduced the Code of Corporate Conduct. 
Private agencies are proposing their own initiatives and publishing their own corporate 
governance ratings. 
What lies behind these changes, and what real effects will the changes have? After years 
of repeated, grave malfeasances against minority shareholders and fierce battles for assets, 
controlling owners of Russian firms have begun to understand that the only way to sustain the 
development of their companies is by attracting external funds. Alternatively, some of the 
large owners simply want to exit their businesses by selling their assets at a good price. 
Both of these goals call for increasing the value of companies. Russian corporations are 
severely undervalued compared to their Western counterparts.1 A substantial increase in a 
company’s valuation can be achieved through building reputation and adhering to the 
standards of good governance; this is where the demand for good corporate governance 
comes in. A study of about 100 of the largest Russian companies by Black, Love and 
Rachinsky (2006) finds a substantial and statistically significant positive impact of the quality 
of corporate governance on a firm’s market valuation. It is unlikely to be simply coincidental 
that both the stock market and the quality of corporate governance in Russian listed firms 
have remarkably increased over the last few years (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
1 For example, Gazprom, the world’s largest oil and gas company based on reserves, had a market capitalization 
in October 2005 of only about $1 per barrel of proven reserves, compared to $18 for major Western oil 
companies such as Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell (Economist, 2005) 
 3
Figure 1: Cumulative increase in the average governance score in a sample of 100 largest 
Russian companies (left scale). 
The score for each company was obtained on the basis of corporate governance scores provided by five different 
agencies that evaluate corporate governance in Russia (for details see Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006)). 
Shaded area shows the RTS (Russian Trading System) index value (right scale). 
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At the same time, recent international empirical studies show that efforts of companies to 
improve their corporate governance will have only a limited effect unless the country-level 
legal environment is strong and favorable to protecting investor rights (Durnev and Kim 
(2005), Klapper and Love (2004)). Therefore, initiatives from “above” directed to the general 
improvement of the legal system in the country are crucial for building an environment that 
would help Russian companies attract external finance. 
The classical definition of corporate governance refers to the “ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997, p. 737)). In this study we take a broader perspective of corporate 
governance by taking into account the roles of various stakeholders, other than investors, in 
corporate governance (Tirole (2001)). This approach is more appropriate for Russia since 
stakeholders, primarily governments of different levels and workers play an important role in 
a firm’s decisions. 
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The Russian corporate environment is characterized by high ownership concentration in 
firms, especially in the hands of insiders, weak legal institutions that lead to high private 
benefits of control, underdeveloped capital markets, a segmented labor market, and 
significant involvement of the state in business. 
These features make the focus of the debate on Russian corporate governance 
substantially different from the one in the developed market economies, especially the Anglo-
Saxon countries. The main conflicts of interest in Russian firms are between large and small 
shareholders, rather than between a manager and a large number of dispersed shareholders, as 
in the US or UK. On top of that, large owners are often in conflict amongst themselves, and 
with outside raiders who are attracted by possibilities to seize assets. Yet, there is another 
“layer” of conflict: the one between the state and private business, whose objectives may 
diverge substantially. Recently, government intervention into business has become very 
significant. A number of large companies moved under state control, others have been 
accused of tax avoidance and received large claims for unpaid taxes from the tax authorities; 
and the government has also tried to exclude foreigners from participation in large profitable 
businesses, such as oil extraction.  
Our survey proceeds as follows. We first describe how the initial conditions and general 
environment have affected the evolution of ownership and financial markets in Russia. Then, 
we describe the main conflicts and mechanisms of corporate governance in Russian firms. 
Finally, we review the current changes and trends in corporate governance. The appendix 
contains a brief description of Russian corporate law as well as recent and proposed changes 
in the law. 
 
2. Privatization and evolution of ownership 
 
The objective of privatization in Russia was to quickly create demand for the institutions 
of private property. According to the ideologists of Russian privatization, the initial 
distribution of assets was not a crucial issue. They relied on the “coasian” type of argument 
that the property would eventually be distributed efficiently. Russian privatization created 
tens of thousands of firms in which significant shares were distributed among insiders (both 
workers and managers). As a result, privatization led to insider dominated ownership 
structures, with a significant managerial control as managers have normally been able to 
convince or coerce workers to either vote with the management or sell their shares to the 
management. In fact, redistribution of ownership in the years after privatization was 
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characterized by two main parallel trends (see Table 1): (i) further concentration of control in 
the hands of managers and (ii) an increase in the shares of outside blockholders. Overall, as 
surveys Biletskiy et al (2001), Guriev et al (2004), CEFIR and IET (2006) and IFC (2003, 
2005) find, ownership became very concentrated.2 
Not only has the ownership become concentrated at the company level, but also on the 
aggregate. Russian assets have ended up in the hands of a small group of people. According 
to Guriev and Rachinsky (2005), about 40% of the Russian industry belongs to 22 largest 
business groups, controlled by “oligarchs”. The IFC (2005) study as well as a study by 
CEFIR and IET (2003) finds that legal entities prevail among Russian controlling owners, 
which is consistent with the wide-spread participation of firms in business groups. About a 
third of companies in the IFC and CEFIR and IET studies are members of groups of firms. 
According to Lazareva and Rachinsky (2006), in 18% of firms having large outside 
blockholders, these owners were the firm’s suppliers – and in another 18% of firms, their 
customers. 
 
Table 1. Distribution and dynamics of ownership in Russian firms. 
 
Panel 1a. Data from Biletskiy et al. (2001), survey of 530 industrial firms in 20 regions 
1994 1999 1994 - 99
Type of owner 
Mean share 
Conditional 
mean  
Mean share 
Conditional 
mean 
Mean 
change  
State 33.0 59.8 22.6 61.6 -8.8  
Private 67.0 85.9 77.4 91.3 +8.9 
Insider 49.1 65.5 44.4 55.3 -5.1 
Manager 10.6 15.3 14.8 19.8 +2.8 
Worker 35.9 51.6 29.2 39.7 -6.4 
Outsider 17.5 38.5 32.7 52.9 +14.2 
Legal entity 11.1 25.1 19.6 39.4 +7.1 
Individual 4.1 17.7 9.2 24.3 +4.3 
Foreigner 1.5 25.2 3.2 25.8 +1.8 
 
                                                 
2  Dolgopyatova (2003) summarizes several other studies which reveal similar tendencies: growing 
concentration of ownership and emergence of controlling owner in a large share of firms. 
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Panel 1b. Data from Guriev et al (2004) and CEFIR and IET (2006)3, surveys of several 
hundred Russian large and medium size companies 
 2002 2006 
 average 
stake, % 
median 
stake, % 
# of 
companies 
average 
stake, % 
median 
stake, % 
# of 
companies 
Management 19.3 6.0 641 21.5 3.0 659 
Largest outside 
blockholder 
23.9 15.0 642 35.3 20.0 661 
All small 
shareholders 
(< 5% stakes) 
23.6 12.0 581 16.5 10.0 641 
 
Panel 1c. Data from IFC (2003, 2005), surveys of several hundred large and medium size 
companies 
Share of the largest shareholder in the 
company 
2002 
% of firms. 
2004 
% of firms. 
50% + 19 48 
25% - 50% 23 27 
0 – 24.99% 58 25 
Number of firms 307 442 
 
 
3. Capital market development 
 
Despite substantial growth in recent years, the Russian financial market remains 
underdeveloped. Although in 2005 the stock market capitalization relative to GDP in Russia 
was about 44% of GDP, which is comparable to about 43% in Germany and Italy (though 
substantially lower than 75% in Japan, 83% in France and 135% in the US), the volume of 
traded shares relative to GDP was only about 25%, compared to 57% in Germany, 81% in 
Japan, 72% in France and 182% in the US. The volume of private sector credit as a share of 
                                                 
3 Guriev et al (2004) is based on the surveys conducted by CEFIR and IET in 2003 and 2002. The design of the 
surveys was almost identical to the one used in CEFIR and IET (2006), the target sample of companies was also 
very similar.  
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GDP in 2005 was only 21% compared to about 75% in Japan, 90% in France, 116% in 
Germany and 222% in the US.4 
Most firms have to rely on internally generated funds to make investments rather than on 
bank credit, bond or equity issues. Markets for stocks and bonds are still small, illiquid and 
are plagued by information asymmetries. These aspects raise the cost of external funds for 
companies, which in turn makes self-dealing a relatively more attractive strategy for 
controlling shareholders. In addition, the absence of reliable market signals about a firm’s 
performance and prospects renders conditioning managerial compensation on stock price 
ineffective (if possible at all), hampers evaluation of capital budgeting decisions and impedes 
the emergence of an efficient market for corporate control. 
 
3.1.  Stock market 
 
Russia’s stock market is dominated by the natural resources sector (see Figure 4). Since 
1998 the stock market has grown substantially (see Figure 2). The number of firms traded on 
a regular basis is very small; a few traded firms comprise most of the market capitalization 
(see Figure 3). 
A positive trend is that more and more firms are considering going public and the number 
of IPOs, though still small, is growing fast. However, most firms prefer to list their shares 
abroad via depository receipts 5 , which have been worrying Russia’s financial market 
regulator, the Federal Financial Markets Service (FFMS). In order to force companies to list 
their shares in Russia, FFMS has introduced a rule that at least 30% of any new issue must be 
placed in Russia. The agency is planning to increase this share to 50%.6 
                                                 
4 Source: Beck et al (2006) 
5 In all of the 10 largest Russian IPOs the companies listed their shares on LSE. Some of them did 
simultaneous listings on Russian exchanges as well. 
6 The opponents of this view say that restrictive measures are not the best way to keep firms listing in the 
country. They suggest that reforms directed towards ensuring higher stock market integrity (e.g. adopting a law 
on insider trading and creation of the Central Depository) and strengthening enforcement are better ways to 
convince firms to list on Russian exchanges. FFSM agrees that such steps are crucial for the stock market’s 
development, but views them as part of a longer term program. Meanwhile, keeping firms from only listing 
abroad is intended to prevent the market from leaving Russia now. 
At the same time, companies and underwriters find ways to bypass the FFSM’s rule. For example, the LSE-
listed Pyaterochka Holding N.V. (now X5 Retail Group N.V.) and Evraz Group S.A., despite having most of 
their assets in Russia and being controlled by Russian residents, were incorporated abroad and, thus, did not 
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Figure 2. RTS (Russian Trading System) index. 
RTS index is one of the main indicators of Russian stock market development. After the August ’98 financial 
crisis, the RTS index has shown fast growth. 
RTS index
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                                                                                                               Source: RTS 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of the market capitalization of the 200 largest companies. 
The total capitalization of the 200 largest companies as of 1 September 2006 was $832.7 bn. 33% of this was the 
capitalization of Gazprom, the state-controlled natural gas monopoly. The biggest 20 companies represented 
84.0% of the total capitalization compared with 78.8% in 2005. 
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      Source: Expert-RA, own calculations  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
have to conform to the rule. Underwriters also contribute to bypassing the rule by purchasing stakes at IPOs and 
then issuing depository receipts on these shares abroad. 
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Figure 4. Capitalization breakdown by sector as of 1 September 2006. 
Russia’s stock market is dominated by the natural resources sectors. The weight of the oil and gas sector 
increased by 5% in the last year, mostly due to the Gazprom capitalization growth and the successful IPO of the 
state-controlled oil company Rosneft. 
Oil and Gas
64%
Metals
9%
Telecoms
6%
Electricity
9%
Banks
6%
Manufacturing
1%
Other
5%
 
                                                                               Source: Expert-RA, own calculations 
 
3.2.  Bond market 
 
The domestic bond market has developed much more compared to domestic IPOs (though 
the current IPO boom may change this). The last 5-6 years saw a rapid growth of the volume 
of corporate bond issues. More and more, companies use bond issues to finance M&A 
transactions, the number and the volume of which has also grown in recent years. Figure 5 
demonstrates the dynamics of the bond market over the last years. 
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Figure 5. Volume of the Russian bond market. 
                                                                                  Source: www.cbonds.ru, own calculations 
                                                        (Note: data on eurobonds prior to 2002 were unavailable) 
 
3.3.  Banks 
 
Due to the dominance of the state-owned banks, Russia’s banking sector is highly 
concentrated. By far the largest player in the Russia’s banking sector is the state-owned 
Sberbank, holding almost 32% of the total assets of the banking sector (Figure 7). It is 
followed by a few other state-controlled banks. The largest private bank by the size of total 
assets is Alfa-Bank with a share of only 3%. Since 1999 the amount of bank credit to firms, 
banks and individuals has been steadily growing (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Volume of outstanding bank loans to firms, banks, and households. 
 
Source: Central Bank of Russia, own calculations 
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Figure 7. Largest banks’ shares in the total net assets of the Russian banking sector. 
Total net assets of 500 largest banks as of 1 January 2007 were almost US$500 bn. Sberbank dominates the 
banking sector with 27% of total net assets. The largest 5 banks cover almost half of total net assets of the 
banking sector. 
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                                                                                       Source: Expert RBC, own calculations 
 
3.4. Sources of outside finance 
  
The need for outside financing is one of the key motives for establishing good corporate 
governance practices, especially when a firm decides to turn to public equity markets. 
The table below shows the breakdown of outside financing by sources and years. The 
amount of outside financing has grown substantially over the last years. While bank loans 
remain the main source of outside funds, bond financing has been growing faster and its 
volume is becoming comparable to the volume of bank loans. Public equity has dramatically 
risen in the past 3 years thanks to the IPO boom and is expected to grow rapidly in the 
coming years. 
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Table 2. Sources of outside finance in Russia7 
Bank loans Bonds 
Public Equity: 
IPO, SPO Private equity Total 
Year 
bln. 
USD %  
bln. 
USD %  
bln. 
USD %  
bln. 
USD %  
Bln. 
USD 
2001 15.5 92.3% 1 6.0% 0 0.0% 0.3 1.8% 16.8
2002 16.1 73.9% 5.3 24.3% 0.3 1.4% 0.1 0.5% 21.8
2003 21.9 66.8% 10.5 32.0% 0.3 0.9% 0.1 0.3% 32.8
2004 34.6 65.8% 14.3 27.2% 2.6 4.9% 1.1 2.1% 52.6
2005 41.2 57.4% 24.7 34.4% 4.9 6.8% 1 1.4% 71.8
2006 65 52.6% 38 30.8% 19.1 15.5% 1.4 1.1% 123.5
Sources: Central Bank of Russian Federation, www.cbonds.ru, Renaissance Capital, Russian 
Venture Capital Association, own calculations 
 
4. Legal environment 
 
The concentration of ownership and poor development of financial markets are 
consequences of Russia’s weak legal environment. Recent research has shown that it is strong 
law enforcement, rather than the mere content of the laws, that is crucial for the ability of 
firms to attract external finance (see e.g. Pistor et al (2000)). While Russia quickly caught up 
with the West in adjusting their company and bankruptcy laws to Western standards, law 
enforcement remains poor (Pistor et al (2000)). This is primarily due to widespread 
corruption in courts, regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies.8 
Importantly, the high income inequality stemming from weak legal institutions has 
precluded demand for good institutions (i.e. ones that ensure strong enforcement of property 
rights). The rich have favored low protection of property rights, keeping the country in a 
“bad” institutional equilibrium (Sonin (2003), Glaeser et al (2003)). 
                                                 
7 The numbers in the table should be view as approximate as they come from several different sources. In 
addition, public equity figures are gross, i.e. disbursements to stockholders (such as dividends or stock 
repurchases) are not subtracted, while the figures for the other sources are net of disbursements to investors. 
However, this difference should not affect the qualitative picture as dividends and stock repurchases have been 
rather small compared to equity issues in Russia. 
8 According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Russia is ranked 121th out of 163 
countries in 2006 (a higher number corresponds to higher corruption). 
 13
When the law does not protect minority shareholders, the value of control becomes 
extremely high (Dyck and Zingales (2002)). Strong control both insures against expropriation 
by others and provides the possibility of expropriating minority shareholders (Bebchuk 
(1999)). This explains the fierce wars for assets and the increase in ownership (and control) 
concentration observed in Russia in late 1990s – early 2000s. 
 
5. Corporate conflicts and mechanisms of corporate governance in Russia 
 
In this section we discuss the main mechanisms of corporate governance in Russia, 
focusing on their benefits and costs. Our discussion is based on a survey by Becht, Bolton 
and Röell (2002) which summarizes existing theoretical and empirical work on a variety of 
corporate governance mechanisms, and a paper by Berglöf and Claessens (2004), which 
reconsiders the Becht, Bolton and Röell’s framework for developing and transition 
economies. 
The weakness of Russia’s legal institutions and the resulting high ownership 
concentration in companies and underdeveloped stock market have predetermined the types 
of corporate conflicts and the mechanisms of corporate governance that prevail in Russia 
today. 
In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon model, the conflict between a professional manager and a 
large number of uncoordinated small shareholders is irrelevant in Russia – managers are 
either controlling shareholders themselves or tightly controlled by/affiliated with large 
shareholders. Instead, the main conflict of interest in Russian firms is between 
controlling/large blockholders and minority shareholders. Weak legal institutions together 
with underdeveloped financial and corporate control markets lower the cost of opportunistic 
behavior towards minority shareholders. As a consequence, Russia has had numerous cases 
of abuses of minority shareholder rights by controlling owners. The methods that have been 
used include transfer pricing, dilution of shares, asset stripping and even outright theft. 
On top of the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, there 
have been numerous wars for control amongst large shareholders and between firms’ insiders 
and outside raiders. 
Yet, there is another “layer” of conflict: the one between the state and private business, 
whose objectives may diverge substantially. Overall, the current trend of state intervention in 
business is getting more and more pronounced, while abuses of minority shareholder rights 
by controlling shareholders are becoming less frequent.  
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5.1.  Ownership concentration as a mechanism of corporate governance 
 
Despite all the costs of discretional behavior on the part of controlling shareholders, it is 
important to understand that ownership concentration is nothing but a second-best response to 
the problem of weak institutions of property rights, and is the main mechanism of corporate 
governance in Russia. Concentration of ownership serves as a substitute (however imperfect) 
to the poor legal protection of shareholders. Under weak legal protection only a large owner 
has enough power and incentives to ensure that he is not expropriated by the management or 
other large owners. 
The main benefit of ownership concentration is that it reduces the separation of 
ownership and control, typical for firms in Anglo-Saxon countries. Since a controlling owner 
has a large stake, his interests are better aligned with those of other shareholders, i.e. with the 
shareholder value maximization. When a controlling shareholder is not the manager himself, 
by virtue of his power and thanks to strong incentives provided by his stake, he monitors the 
manager, exerts tight control over managerial discretion and can fire him relatively easily. 
According to Rachinsky (2006), cases of managerial turnover are frequently related to a 
change of the controlling shareholder in a firm. In this situation, executive compensation 
schemes as a mechanism of corporate governance lose importance, especially given poor 
development of the stock market, which does not allow for a system that effectively 
conditions managerial compensation on the company’s stock price. 
Ownership concentration, however, comes at a cost. As we have mentioned, too much 
control opens up possibilities for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders (see Box 1). Another possible cost is excessive monitoring of managers, which 
may destroy valuable private benefits of the manager and kill his initiative (Burkart, Gromb, 
Panunzi (1997), Pagano and Röell (1998)). Still other costs of concentrated ownership are 
low liquidity of a company’s stock (Bolton and Von Thadden (1998)) and reduced 
possibilities for diversification (Admatti, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994)). 
The above discussion may lead to the conclusion that strengthening protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights would no doubt be desirable, as it would eliminate the need for the costly 
mechanism of concentrated ownership. This logic, however, has serious flaws when applied 
in a country with weak legal institutions. The dangers of empowering minority shareholders 
are increased opportunities for abusive use of minority shareholders’ rights by large players 
in corporate wars, in particular by greenmailers and raiders. In fact, corporate aggressors have 
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been making extensive use of the minority protection provisions in the Russian law on joint 
stock companies. In order to stop this practice, the government is now proposing amendments 
to the law that are supposed to make abuses of the JSC law more costly for corporate 
aggressors without simultaneously reducing minority shareholder protection (see subsection 
7.2 for details). 
 
 
 
5.2.  Multiple large shareholders 
 
In a world where controlling owners have large discretion, one potentially effective 
mechanism of corporate governance is sharing control between several large blockholders. 
Some Russian companies do have several large owners of a comparable power. For 
example, Alfa Group (through its subsidiary Altimo) has abstained from holding majority 
stakes in the telecom companies it has invested in, preferring to have just a blocking stake 
Box 1. Expropriation of minority shareholders in Russia 
 
In the late 1990s expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling owners was very widespread. 
For example, controlling shareholders of many oil companies used transfer pricing to divert the companies’ 
profits to intermediaries owned by them. Desai et al (2005) provide the example of Sibneft whose 
production subsidiary would sell a large fraction of the produced oil to a “third party intermediary” called 
Runicom at just $2.20/barrel; Runicom would resell then the oil abroad at market prices that were several 
times as high (part of the reason for doing this was tax evasion). Runicom was associated with the then 
controlling shareholder of Sibneft, Roman Abramovich, but Sibneft was not a significant Runicom
shareholder. After the government took a number of serious steps in 2000 and 2001 towards stopping the 
transfer pricing by Sibneft, returns to minority shareholders rose well above the industry trends. Some other 
famous cases of minority shareholder expropriation in the 1990s involving Yukos, Sidanco, Gazprom and 
Sibneft are well described in Black et al (2000). 
The wave of abuses of minority shareholders’ rights has substantially weakened by now, but conflicts 
between controlling and minority shareholders still are not infrequent.  In June 2006 a group of institutional 
investors, minority shareholders of two subsidiaries of the Mechel Steel Group, publicly accused the Group
of unfair shares swap ratio in the process of consolidation of Mechel’s subsidiaries initiated by the 
management, transfer pricing and a failure to disclose information to minority shareholders. The investors 
appealed to NYSE with a request to suspend trading in Mechel’s ADRs on NYSE and filed several lawsuits 
in Russia. NYSE did not satisfy the investors’ request, while the court proceedings are currently under way. 
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(above 25%). In these companies there are other (one or two) large blockholders, holding no 
majority stake either.9 
While, acting as a group, large blockholders can expropriate small shareholders, such 
ownership distribution can also create conflicts among large owners. These conflicts can be 
both value-destroying and value-creating. 
On the one hand, multiple large owners provide checks and balances against each other. 
By mutual monitoring and control they restrict each other from opportunistic behavior. By 
having the power to block proposed policies, they may help ensure that projects that benefit 
one blockholder at the expense of the other shareholders do not go through (Gomes and 
Novaes (2005)). Also the necessity to gain support of small shareholders when it comes to 
voting on important decisions (like the election of directors or changes in a corporate charter) 
can make blockholders compete with each other for votes which eventually benefits small 
shareholders (Bloch and Hege (2001)). It is in such situations that the presence of several 
large owners can benefit corporate governance. 
On the other hand, the same power to block proposed decisions may lead to inefficient 
deadlocks (Gomes and Novaes (2005)). Perhaps, more seriously, in the Russian institutional 
environment, presence of more than one large shareholder sometimes results in fierce wars 
for control that can involve substantial costs. 
Empirical literature on various countries suggests that multiple large owners can both 
create and destroy value. It thus remains ultimately an empirical question whether 
multiplicity of blockholders in Russian firms is on average beneficial. 
                                                 
9 These companies include Vimpelcom (44% of voting shares - Alfa, 29.9% - Norwegian mobile operator 
Telenor) and Golden Telecom (26.9% - Alfa, 18.4% - Telenor, 11.1% - state controlled long-distance 
telecommunications operator Rostelecom). Abroad Alfa has been following a similar strategy: it controls 43.5% 
in a GSM operator Kyivstar (Ukraine), which is below Telenor’s share of 56.5%, and 13.2% in a GSM operator 
Turkcell (Turkey). Currently Alfa is also disputing over a blocking ownership stake in a telecom company 
Megafon with an investment fund called IPOC. 
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Box 2. Conflicts between large shareholders in Russia 
 
A recent example of such a conflict is the ongoing collision between Alfa and Telenor, regarding
Vimpelcom, extensively covered in the media. The principal shareholders of Vimpelcom, Altimo (Alfa’s
subsidiary) and Telenor (see footnote 7) cannot agree on the strategy of the firm in the Ukrainian market. 
Altimo and Telenor share the ownership of a Ukrainian mobile operator Kyivstar, where 43.5% of 
equity belongs to Altimo (through a subsidiary called Storm) and 56.5% belongs to Telenor. In November 
2005 Vimpelcom acquired a Ukrainian GSM operator Ukrainian Radio Systems (URS) despite Telenor’s
opposition to the deal. Telenor did not want the appearance of a competitor to Kyivstar in the Ukrainian 
market and blocked the deal in the board, arguing that the price paid for URS was too high. However, the 
general shareholder meeting approved it. 
The origin of the conflict seems to lie in the initial desire of Alfa Group to merge Kyivstar and 
Vimpelcom. Such plan was resisted by the Norwegians as that would make Altimo the largest shareholder in 
the merged company, hence depriving Telenor of its control over the Kyivstar assets. Moreover, Telenor
would no longer be able to consolidate its very successful Ukrainian business (accounting for about 10% of 
total revenues) in its financial statements. Thus, the URS deal can be viewed as a tactical move by Altimo to 
exert pressure on Telenor. 
The conflict has already lasted for a couple of years, involving several court proceedings and the failure 
of the board to approve Vimpelcom’s annual budget for 2006. Over the recent months Altimo has been 
accumulating shares in Vimpelcom through open market purchases. As a result, Altimo’s current share 
allows it to increase the number of its representatives in Vimpelcom’s board of directors, which strengthens 
Altimo’s position in the conflict. 
Another example of a collision between large shareholders was a conflict between RENOVA Group and 
the managers of a titan manufacturer VSMPO-Avisma. RENOVA held 13.4%, while the managers held 
57.8% of the shares. At some point RENOVA decided to be the sole controlling owner. The two parties had 
a shareholder agreement called “Russian roulette: if one of the parties offers its stake to the other party, the 
latter should either buy the stake at the proposed price or sell its own stake to the former party at this price. 
RENOVA offered its stake to the managers of VSMPO-Avisma at a below market price in a hope that the 
latter would not be able to raise funds for the purchase and RENOVA would then buy the managers’ share 
on attractive terms. However, the managers found the necessary amount and bought RENOVA’s stake. 
RENOVA claimed that the raised funds were collateralized by the managers’ equity share, which was 
prohibited by the shareholder agreement. Until recently RENOVA had been challenging the deal in court. 
With the appearance of the Rosoboronexport, a 100% state-owned company that recently decided to acquire 
control over VSMPO-Avisma, the conflicting parties finally came to a settlement. 
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5.3.  Boards of directors 
 
With ownership being very concentrated in Russia, companies’ board members cannot be 
considered as truly independent players. Normally, boards are simply one of the channels 
through which large shareholders, management and the government influence a firm’s 
decisions. A joint study by the Higher School of Economics and the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (2004) (Table 3) as well as the  recent study by Standard & Poor’s (2007) (Table 4) 
find that boards are dominated by management and large shareholders’ representatives. 
Lazareva and Rachinsky (2006) show that the fraction of insiders on boards is positively 
related to the management’s share, and negatively related to the share of the largest outsider 
(Table 6). It is also positively related to the share of small owners. This might be due to the 
fact that many small owners in Russian companies are actually employees who usually vote 
along with the management. Regional and local authorities turn out to be quite influential 
stakeholders even if they do not own shares; there is a tendency to include their 
representatives on boards. 
The fraction of independent (unaffiliated) directors on boards is small (IFC (2005), S&P 
(2007)). Nevertheless, recent observations show that some firms are trying to keep pace with 
Western companies in following good board practices. They are taking certain steps towards 
building the independence of boards and strengthening oversight over the managers.10 At the 
same time, there seems to be a lack of proper understanding of what “independence” means 
(IFC (2005)). Moreover, it may be relatively easy to name directors who are formally 
independent, but in reality have close ties with the management or the controlling 
shareholder. 
As for the functions performed by boards, Lazareva and Rachinsky (2006) document that 
these are linked with the ownership and board structure, which is not surprising. Their main 
results concerning board functions are: 
• on average, boards spent too much time on tactical issues (Table 5), which is 
consistent with the insider domination in Russian firms (such concerns normally 
should be performed by management); 
• as the regression analysis shows (Table 6), controlling for other variables, the 
bigger the management share, the more time the board devoted to tactical issues; 
                                                 
10 As you can see from tables 4 and 5, in the boards of largest listed firms insiders’ power is decreasing. Firms 
that are listed abroad have a significantly larger proportion of independent (unaffiliated) directors. The studies 
also document some improvements in the number and independence of audit committees. 
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• the aggregate time spent on control of management and on analysis of company 
financial statements, on the contrary, decreased with the management’s share; 
• the time spent on strategy increased with the share of the largest outsider. 
 
Table 3. Board composition in 1998 and 2002, data from the study by HSE and BEA (2004) 
of almost 300 Russian enterprises. 
Representatives of shareholders and 
stakeholders 
Share in a board at 
the end of 1998, 
% 
Share in a board at 
the beginning of 
2002, % 
Employees 60.3 56.0 
          Including: managers 38.5 35.4 
Large individual shareholders 16.5 17.9 
Government (all levels) 5.1 6.7 
Commercial organizations (including financial) 12.0 12.7 
Non-commercial organizations 1.6 1.5 
Other directors, including independent 4.5 5.2 
Number of firms 278 294 
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Table 4.Board composition in 2005 and 2006, data from the study by S&P (2007) of 75 
largest Russian public companies. 
 75 public 
companies 
17 LSE-listed 
companies 
7 NYSE/NASDAQ-
listed companies 
2006 
Insiders 66.3 62.5 38.0 
Outsiders 33.7 37.5 62.0 
Representatives of 
minority shareholders 
13.9 6.6 28.9 
Representatives of 
strategic noncontrolling 
investors 
10.9 6.1 27.6 
Representatives of 
portfolio investors 
2.9 0.5 1.3 
Unaffiliated directors 19.9 31.0 33.0 
2005 
Insiders 70.1 75.0 39.3 
Outsiders 29.9 25.0 60.7 
Representatives of 
minority shareholders 
13.9 5.8 33.7 
Representatives of 
strategic noncontrolling 
investors 
9.4 3.5 31.0 
Representatives of 
portfolio investors 
4.5 2.3 2.7 
Unaffiliated directors 16.0 19.2 27.0 
 
Table 5. Board structure and functions. Source: Lazareva and Rachinsky (2006). 
Variable mean median min max # of firms 
Number of BoD members 6.6 7 0 23 558
Number of BoD members – employees of 
the firm 
3.4 3 0 15 560
Number of board meetings in 2002 8.3 7 0 52 525
% of time spent on discussion of company 
statements 
27 20 0 100 288
% of time spent on control over management 18 15 0 85 288
% of time spent on strategic management 27 25 0 80 288
% of time spent on tactical issues 22 20 0 100 288
Table 6. Board structure and functions regressed on firm size and ownership structure. Source: Lazareva and Rachinsky (2006). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (4)+(5) (6) (7) 
 Size of 
BoD 
Share of 
inside 
directors 
Number of 
meetings 
in 2002 
Time spent 
on 
statements, %
Time spent on 
control of 
management, % 
Time spent on 
control of 
management and on 
statements, % 
Time spent 
on strategy, 
% 
Time spent 
on tactics, % 
Log 
employment 
2001 
0.88*** -3.55*** 1.51*** -3.89** 1.88 -2.01 1.90 2.09 
Share of 
management 
2003 
1.24** 44.11*** 0.32 -11.35 -5.31 -16.66** 2.18 19.53*** 
Share of 
largest 
outsider 
2003 
1.00** -33.67*** -2.67* -9.50 3.22 -6.28 13.24** -3.69 
Share of 
small owners 
2003 
1.73*** 16.19*** 2.60 6.35 -1.82 4.52 1.69 3.85 
Constant -0.03 54.20*** 2.16 65.62*** 4.70 70.32*** 7.25 1.63 
Observations 326 307 307 198 198 198 198 198 
R-squared 0.24 0.50 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.14 
 Regional and industry dummies included; 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
5.4. Market for corporate control 
 
In recent years Russia has experienced a wave of hostile takeovers. Hostile takeovers 
exist in any market economy, and even in developed countries the public attitude towards 
them is controversial. In Russia, however, the methods that corporate raiders use are often not 
only ethically questionable, but also pseudo-legal or illegal, i.e. “grey” and “black” schemes 
(involving bribing courts and regulatory agencies, falsification of documents, using so-called 
“administrative resource”, “black” PR, and even direct threats and violence). The 
consequences of weak legal enforcement allowing the use of such schemes are amplified 
further by the poor financial market development, which hampers “civilized” redistribution of 
assets. Social distrust in the outcomes of privatization is also playing an important role. Many 
takeover schemes are conceived based on reviews of privatization deals. 
In the eyes of the public, raiders and greenmailers are often demonized as aggressors that 
ruthlessly destroy normally functioning companies. Setting aside the moral issues, takeovers 
bring about economic costs. First of all, the outcome of many takeovers results in a 
substantial redistribution to shareholders from other stakeholders of a firm (e.g. workers). 
Sometimes this redistribution is ex-post inefficient because the parties fail to bargain 
efficiently over the outcome of a takeover due to either informational asymmetries between 
them or the free-rider problem on the part of stakeholders. Moreover, the mere prospect of a 
takeover undermines the value of long-term implicit contracts between shareholders and 
other stakeholders, as shareholders cannot be trusted to uphold these contracts when faced 
with an opportunity to profitably sell their shares to a raider (Shleifer and Summers (1988)). 
This leads to ex-ante inefficiencies. 
Secondly, even when stakeholders are left out of the picture, a takeover driven by the 
raider’s private benefits of control rather than by efficiency improvement considerations may 
be value-reducing (Grossman and Hart (1988)). Third, the parties to a conflict spent large 
recourses on offense and defense respectively, sometimes comparable to the assets’ value. 
Fourth, there are costs associated with the interruption in the normal business conduct and 
stripping the firm of its assets. Yet probably the most important cost of hostile takeovers in 
the Russian context is that insecurity of property rights reduces incentives to invest in the 
first place, and forces the owner to spend resources on preventive measures against potential 
takeover attempts. Finally, due to the fear of losing control, controlling owners prefer to hold 
large shares in their firms, a practice which implies low diversification of their holdings and 
results in low liquidity of firms’ stock. 
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There exists, however, a positive view that raiders are also a necessary element of the 
market, forcing managers to work better (Scharfsein (1988)) and improve corporate 
governance (Guriev et al (2004)) and helping the transfer of badly managed companies to 
more efficient hands (Manne (1965)). Indeed, many Russian enterprises suffer from bad 
governance and management and sorely need restructuring. At the same time, it is often 
remarked that it is precisely these firms that are more likely to be attacked by raiders. 
Arguably, a threat of a takeover may lead to worse, rather than better, corporate 
governance, since good minority shareholder protection makes it more difficult to take quick 
decisions after your firm has been attacked (e.g. to quickly divert assets from the company, 
making it thereby unattractive for the raider). Moreover, raising the transparency of a firm’s 
ownership structure and financial flows can attract raiders and make a takeover easier. 
Overall, the net effect of takeovers in Russia is unclear and is ultimately an empirical 
question. Serious empirical research is needed to understand which are the characteristics of 
firms that are being taken over, what happens to such firms after a takeover, and how a 
takeover threat affects managers’ and controlling shareholders’ behavior. 
Regardless of the aggregate effect of hostile takeovers in Russia, it is obvious that illegal 
methods of acquiring control bear large social costs. Illegal methods undermine the property 
rights institutions and cause distrust in the legal system. Fortunately, the problem of hostile 
takeovers has recently attracted much attention among government officials of various ranks, 
including some ministers and the president. The legislators have begun to introduce 
amendments in the laws aimed at stopping the practices of “black” and “grey” takeover 
schemes, while investigation and enforcement agencies have started to scrutinize “strange” 
court rulings, punish some judges for unjust decisions, and file criminal charges against some 
raiders.12 However useful these actions are, it is important to recognize that unless corruption 
and the attitude both from the public and the state towards the privatization outcome change, 
legislative reforms only offer a partial solution to the problem.13 
                                                 
12  See subsection 7.2 for a description of recent legislative changes and proposed reforms. For example, 
according to the proposals of the Russian Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, any dispute between 
shareholders should only be considered by an arbitrage court located in the place where the company is situated. 
This change is intended to stop the practice of using distant courts by raiders for obtaining all kinds of “strange” 
rulings against current owners of a company (sometimes these rulings turn out to be passed by non-existing 
judges). 
13 Both the strength and weakness of simply changing legislation can be demonstrated by the introduction of the 
new Bankruptcy Code in 2004. Prior to this, raiders used loopholes in the code extensively to take over 
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companies by means of the forced bankruptcy procedure. The new code substantially reduced the possibility to 
make use of this mechanism. However, raiders simply turned to the loopholes in the Law on Joint Stock 
Companies instead. 
Another example is a reduction of the length of the statute of limitations on revising privatization deals from 10 
to 3 years, enacted in 2005. While, at first sight, this change can substantially impede the use of the mechanism 
of revising privatization deals for acquiring control over a company, a number of commentators argue that there 
exist relatively easy ways to bypass this restriction. 
Box 3. Hostile takeovers in Russia. 
 
One of the most famous takeover wars of the last 10 years demonstrating the role of courts and 
regulators was the conflict between Bazovy Element and Ilim Pulp Entreprise over pulp assets. Bazovy 
Element acquired 61% from 88% of shares of Kotlassky TsBK (Kotlas Pulp and Paper Co.) owned by Ilim 
Pulp Enterprise in the process of executing court decisions based on claims from individual minority 
shareholders. Later on, these court decisions were abolished. In order to avoid manipulations with the 
shareholder registry, IPE transferred the registry from St-Petersburg Central Registration Company to 
Energoregistrator and then to Energoregistrator’s affiliate – the Central Moscow Depository. St-Petersburg 
Central Registration Company did not transfer the complete set of documents properly; the registry and 
relevant documents were transferred to Energoregistrator in two stages. Due to this procedure two registrars 
kept the company’s register simultaneously and both registrars recorded operations with shares of TsBK in 
its register. The Federal Commission for the Securities Market accused Energoregistrator for recording 
operations without shareholders’ orders and recalled its license, which was soon restored by the court. 
A more recent well-known hostile takeover case involves a GSM operator SMARTS and a well-known 
raider intermediary Sigma. SMARTS is a “closed joint-stock company”, meaning that any shareholder has a 
preemptive right on buying shares when another shareholder wants to sell his shares to a third party. In the 
summer of 2005, the controlling shareholder of SMARTS (who was also its CEO) decided to further 
consolidate his share by buying 20% of the shares from minority shareholders. The shares were bought on 
his behalf by a newly established fund (who was not previously a SMARTS’ shareholder). Just before this 
occurred, Sigma secretly acquired 5 shares of SMARTS in a dubious deal and later claimed its right on this 
20% block on the ground that Sigma’s preemptive rights were ignored in the process of consolidation of 
shares by the CEO. Furthermore, few months later, Sigma bought a claim on an overdue credit from 
Vnesheconombank, collateralized by 25% minus 1 share of SMARTS. That allowed Sigma to claim its right 
on another 25% minus 1 share of the SMARTS’ stock. There have constantly been rumors that Sigma is 
acting in the interest of one of the three dominant GSM operators in Russia, but none of the rumors has ever 
been confirmed. A fight between Sigma and SMARTS’ management is still going on in a number of courts. 
There have been numerous suits filed by Sigma and various individuals that led to rulings favoring Sigma. 
Many of these decisions were later abolished by other courts. It seems that now the SMARTS’ management 
is gaining the upper hand as it has recently achieved a number of important favorable court rulings, in 
particular, the decision invalidating the deal that allowed Sigma to acquire the initial 5 shares of SMARTS. 
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5.5. Employees 
 
Employees (excluding executives) are generally passive in calm times, but may become 
an instrument of a corporate conflict resolution. A distinctive feature of Russian firms is that 
workers still possess significant amount of shares. These shares can become an important 
instrument of defense in the hands of the management in periods of corporate conflicts. 
Managers have often succeeded in obtaining workers’ support by either convincing or 
coercing them to either vote with the management or sell their shares to the management. 
Employees’ shares, however, can also be a target for raiders. If the workers are unhappy 
with the current management (or are convinced that the raider’s management will bring them 
more benefits) they are more likely to sell to the raider. 
Nevertheless, employees are generally on the incumbent management side, because a 
change in control often implies layoffs (even if actual layoffs are unlikely, it may be 
relatively easy for the management to convince the workers that they will lose their jobs with 
the new owner). Sometimes workers have been even used as a “live shield” against raiders. 
There have been a number of examples when workers would actively participate in the 
defense of their “home” enterprise by physically blocking the entry of the “new 
management” into the territory of the enterprise.14 
When, in addition, a regional government is concerned with employment in the region, 
enterprises with large number of workers may receive additional support against raiders from 
the regional authorities.15 
 
5.6.  State involvement (government as a stakeholder) 
 
One of the characteristics of the Russian economy has been substantial interference of the 
state in business. Governments of different levels can in fact be considered as companies’ 
stakeholders, whose goals may significantly diverge from the firm value maximization. 
When the government has a stake in a company it is naturally interested in defending its 
interests as a shareholder. It also has a claim on any firm as a tax collector. However, the 
events of recent years have demonstrated the federal government’s strong tendency to 
increase substantially its intervention in private business, as witnessed by a series of dubious 
                                                 
14 The use of workers as protection against hostile takeovers is not unique to Russia; see Pagano and Volpin 
(2005). 
15 See more on the role of regional governments in subsection 5.7. 
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claims to large companies for unpaid taxes and acquisitions of firms in core industries (some 
of them below market prices). Aggressive tax enforcement policy can actually reduce 
controlling shareholders’ opportunism towards minority shareholders (Desai et al (2005)). If, 
however, it is just a manifestation of the state predatory behavior, it is more likely to worsen 
the investment climate in the country. 
The most egregious case of the government’s expropriation was the (in)famous Yukos 
affair (see Box 4). It has become apparent now that the state is pursuing a strategy of re-
nationalization of large companies in core industries in order to reestablish control over them. 
After the years of accumulation of capital, Russian oligarchs are seeking to exit. The best 
way for them to do so would be to sell their assets to foreigners. However, the government 
opposes such sales as it is afraid to yield control over the key industries.16 The illegitimacy of 
the privatization and grave malfeasances by Russian oligarchs towards the state (tax evasion) 
and minority shareholders in recent years have made it possible for the state to both find legal 
arguments and secure public support for the renationalization. The price for the assets 
acquired so far seems to have been set according to political connections (e.g. close to 100% 
of the market price for Sibneft and Power Machines, almost 0% for Yukos, and below market 
price for United Heavy Machinery). 
Does government predation influence firm’s corporate governance? In recent papers, 
Stutz (2005) and Durnev and Fauver (2007) argue that the risk of expropriation by the state 
reduces controlling shareholders’ incentives to maximize the shareholder value and 
                                                 
16 Apparently, Kremlin authorization is needed for any transaction that is big on a national scale. TNK has 
managed to sell half of its business to BP, but the plans of Yukos to sell to Chevron, and of Power Machines to 
sell to Siemens failed (only after establishing control over Power Machines through RAO UES, the government 
allowed Siemens to buy a block of 25% + 1 share). The recent well-known unsuccessful attempt of Alexei 
Mordashov (the controlling shareholder of Severstal) to merge with Arcelor was authorized by the Kremlin 
apparently because Mordashov convinced the Kremlin to view the deal not as foreigners’ invasion into the 
Russian industry, but as expansion of Russian business abroad. 
The foreigners’ exclusion from the key Russian industries is best manifested in the Gazprom’s acquisitions of 
controlling stakes in Sakhalin Energy and Rusia Petroleum, the operators of oil extraction projects in Sakhalin-2 
oil and gas field and Kovykta gas field respectively. In the first case, Gazprom bought a controlling stake from 
Shell at 20-30% discount to the market price according to various estimations. In the second case, Gazpom is 
buying a controlling stake from TNK-BP, and the price is still to be agreed. Currently the government and the 
Duma are discussing the drafts of two laws (the “Law on Earth’s Interiors” (“Zakon o Nedrah”) and the law on 
limiting foreign investors’ access to strategic industries), which will set restrictions on foreign participation in 
the key Russian industries. These drafts are becoming increasingly restrictive. 
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encourages them to divert corporate profits in order to protect them from seizure by the state. 
Thus, the predatory state leads to a greater expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
corporate insiders. Durnev and Fauver (2007) support this conclusion with empirical 
evidence. They find that firms, located in countries with a more predatory state, practice 
weaker corporate governance and disclose less information. 
Another, more classical, manifestation of the government’s intervention in business is its 
vulnerability to lobbying by large but depressed industries that would not survive without 
state support. Probably the best example in the Russian case is the automotive industry, 
which has long sought a number of measures to protect the national producers from foreign 
imports.17 
                                                 
17 For example, Oleg Deripaska, whose business empire Bazovy Element controls a part of Russian automotive 
assets, has been constantly lobbying for high import tariffs for used foreign cars and opposing Russia’s WTO 
accession. A Russian concern AvtoVaz has been doing similar things; after a recent change of management, the 
new management tried to obtain several billions of subsidies to the company for capital investment. 
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Box 4. The market side of the Yukos affair. 
 
While the actions of the law enforcement agencies against Yukos were covered extensively in the 
media, Goriaev and Sonin (2005) looked at the market side of the Yukos affair. Their work shows a strong 
statistically significant negative reaction of Yukos’ stock price to the charges brought against its top 
management. More interestingly, the Yukos events involving the law enforcement agencies had a generally 
negative statistically significant impact on other large private companies, especially on non-transparent 
companies and those privatized via the infamous loans-for-shares auctions. Curiously, the authors show that 
the stock returns of Gazprom, a state-controlled gas monopolist, rose in response to negative Yukos 
company-related events, which is consistent with the expectation of re-nationalization of Yukos’ assets via 
state companies in the oil and gas sector. These findings suggest that investors considered the likelihood of 
tax and privatization reviews as rather high for Russian companies. 
The table below (from Goriaev and Sonin (2005)) presents the reaction of other Russian stocks to 
Yukos events – the results of a pooled cross-sectional regression of stock returns during the event days on 
the company-specific political risk proxies as well as Yukos’ returns interacted with the proxies during the 
period from January 1, 2003 to November 27, 2003. Gvt denotes the government’s common stock 
ownership; TD is Transparency and Disclosure score provided by S&P; Oil is the oil industry dummy; LS is 
the fraction of company’s shares sold at the loans-for-shares auctions; RY is Yukos’ return. Columns 2 to 7 
report results of the regression estimated in different subsets of the events: positive, negative, negative 
employee-related involving the law enforcement agencies, negative company-related involving the law 
enforcement agencies, negative company-related with the non-law-enforcement agencies, and major 
negative (with Yukos’ return below -2%). The t-statistics are in italics. 
 Negative events 
 
Positive 
events All Pers-Law Comp-Law Comp-Other Major 
Const -2.4** 1.15** 1.42** 1.09 1.4** 2.98*** 
Gvt 7.15** -2.07 -3.74 -1.13 -4.29 
-
10.09*** 
TD 3.07** -1.78** -3.17** -1.21 -2.25** -4.86*** 
Gvt*TD -12.9 6.21 11.64** 2.14 13.69** 26.49*** 
Oil 0.51 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 -0.52 -0.5 
LS 1.79 0.84 0.56 -0.15 2.55** -0.93 
Ry 0.71*** 0.69*** 0.9*** 0.51*** 0.46* 0.91*** 
Ry*Gvt -0.54 -0.71 -1.33*** 0.08 -0.34 -1.65*** 
Ry*TD -0.49 -0.93*** -1.42*** -0.4 -0.68 -1.36*** 
Ry*Gvt*TD 1.61 3.36*** 4.89*** 1.18 3.01 5.85*** 
Ry*Oil 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.28** 0.05 
Ry*LS 0.47 0.86*** 0.9** 0.78*** 0.4 0.68** 
# 
observations 214 788 345 340 257 366 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.38 0.46 0.29 0.25 0.45 
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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5.7.  Regional governments 
 
Regional governments can play various roles. First, they may care about employment in 
the region and, thus, support large distressed firms and oppose their efficient restructuring. 
The example of the car manufacturer AvtoVaz is probably the most telling. Roughly one-fifth 
of the population of Toliatti, the city with more than 700 thousand inhabitants where AvtoVaz 
is located, are employees of AvtoVaz. The enterprise has been producing LADA cars which 
for years have been of substantially lower quality than even second-hand foreign cars. 
Despite protection via high import tariffs on used foreign cars, AvtoVaz has been steadily 
losing market share, but the necessary restructuring simply has been politically unfeasible as 
it would involve massive layoffs. 
The adverse effect of restructuring on employment is reinforced by the low geographical 
labor mobility and segmentation of Russian labor market (Andrienko and Guriev (2004)), 
which substantially increase the social cost of layoffs. 
Regional governors have also engaged in provincial protectionism: extracting rents from 
large enterprises in exchange for protection from creditors or federal tax authorities 
(Ponomareva and Zhuravskaya (2004), Lambert-Mogiliansky et al (2006), Sonin (2005)) or 
from foreign competitors trying to enter the local market. 
At the same time, like the federal government, regional governors may behave in a 
predatory way towards regional firms and participate in ownership redistribution. Having 
close ties with business, regional governments are frequently involved in corporate conflicts 
as an “administrative resource” for one of the parties in the conflict.18 
 
5.8.  Shareholder activism and media 
 
Shareholder activism is a much less important mechanism of corporate governance in 
Russia than it is in the US or UK. The reason is that it requires high transparency of 
companies, strong courts or regulators and independent reputable media. On all these criteria, 
Russia scores low. However there have been a number of successful actions,, mostly by 
                                                 
18 For example, while taking over the Nevinnomyssk Oil Extraction Plant, Pavel Svirsky (the CEO of Sigma 
corporate control intermediary, mentioned earlier) encountered a strong opposition from the regional authorities, 
which resulted in his arrest on the charges of fraud at the request of Stavropol Region prosecutors. Later Svirsky 
was released. 
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foreign institutional investors, who managed to make some significant changes in companies’ 
corporate governance and to reverse corporate governance abuses in a number of firms. 
The most remarkable examples of shareholder activism in Russia are associated with the 
actions of the Hermitage Fund, the fund that is specialized in investing in Russia and that has 
been consciously playing a “media strategy”. As regulators are weak, courts easily 
corruptible and the Russian media lacking in credibility, the Fund has taken action through 
generating news about corporate governance abuses in reputable international business 
newspapers, such as The Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. 
A study by Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2007) convincingly demonstrates the success 
of this strategy. Foreign investors and the foreign public rely on reputable international 
outlets in forming their opinion about a certain company or person. Therefore, a controlling 
shareholder who cares about its international reputation (e.g. because it plans to attract 
foreign investors or gets personal satisfaction from being accepted in the international 
community, such as by joining the World Economic Forum at Davos) should be more 
responsive to criticism in the international media. Moreover, recurrent exposure in the 
international press is likely to attract the regulator’s attention to a corporate malfeasance and 
make him take steps towards stopping it. 
Hermitage success in reverting corporate governance abuses was remarkable in several 
cases, including the wars against Gazprom, Sidanco (an oil holding company), Sberbank and 
RAO UES. 19 The regression analysis of Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2007) confirmed the 
effectiveness of the media strategy. The authors found that coverage in the Anglo-American 
press increased the probability that a corporate governance violation was reversed. 
Furthermore, to avoid endogeneity problems, the authors verified that the Hermitage Fund 
used media extensively and instrumented media coverage with the stake of the Fund. The 
results remained unchanged. 
 
5.9. Reputation, self-enforcement and self-regulatory organizations. 
 
Given weak formal enforcement, alternative mechanisms of commitment to proper 
governance are becoming important, especially as firms start tapping international financial 
markets. Though country-level institutional environment does matter (Durnev and Kim 
                                                 
19 Examples of activism by other minority investors include actions of Prosperity Capital Management 
against Surgutneftegaz, UES and TNK-BP, and those of Vostok Nafta against Slavneft. 
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(2005), Klapper and Love (2004)), a company can substantially raise its valuation by 
voluntarily adhering to standards of good corporate governance. All recent studies find a 
tendency among the largest Russian companies to improve their corporate governance 
practices and increase transparency (see e.g. S&P Transparency and Disclosure survey 
(2006), Russian Institute of Directors study (2006), Black, Love and Rachinsky (2006)). For 
these firms, such efforts seem to be related to their desire to access international capital 
markets as well as to attract strategic foreign investors. 
However, despite the improvements, for most companies there is still a long way to go to 
catch up with their OECD counterparts. The variance in firms’ levels of corporate governance 
is significantly higher in Russia than in most developed countries, a situation that is the norm 
for developing economies (Durnev and Kim (2005)). Small and medium-sized companies 
that are not listed are very slow in improving their corporate governance (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8: Changes in corporate governance practices in Russian large and medium-sized non-
listed enterprises. Percentage of firms that answered positively to 6 different questions about 
their corporate governance practices in 2002 and 2006. 
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           Source: Guriev et al (2004), CEFIR and IET survey (2006) 
 
Public initiatives, as well as regulation by stock exchanges and various professional 
organizations, can reinforce the effects of firms’ unilateral actions. In 2002 the FCSM (now 
FFMS) introduced a code of corporate conduct, based to a large extent on the OECD 
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principles of good corporate governance. The regulator recommended, but did not oblige 
companies to adopt the code’s recommendations, and to disclose which parts of the code they 
follow (and to explain if they do not). However, the FFMS required the stock exchanges to 
enforce compliance with the code or certain parts of it for the firms in the higher tiers. 
As the study by the Russian Institute of Directors (2003) has shown, both disclosure of 
corporate governance practices and the quality of corporate governance itself improved after 
the introduction of the Code. However, it is not clear whether the introduction of the Code 
was the reason, or whether the improvement was a manifestation of a general tendency. 
Guriev et al (2004), after conducting a survey of several hundreds of firms, have concluded 
that firms that had incentives to implement corporate governance norms introduced by the 
Code had already done so. Thus the real effect of the Code is far from being clear. In any 
case, the Code can serve as a blueprint, offering guidance for firms in establishing their own 
governance systems, and it can play an important educational and informational role. 
In addition to the Code, there are various non-governmental organizations that have 
created the rules and codes for their participants. Stock exchanges’ listing requirements is an 
example of such rules. 
Another important contribution to establishing standards of good governance is made by 
rating agencies and other organizations that produce rankings and scores of corporate 
governance20. Corporate governance and transparency scores provide valuable information on 
both the current state of corporate governance in firms and the benchmarks of good 
governance. Most importantly, they allow firms to signal about their corporate governance 
quality, which helps “good” firms to raise their valuations. 
 
6. Conclusion. Challenges and prospects of Russian corporate governance. 
 
The evidence shows that the largest Russian companies gradually are improving their 
corporate governance as they move into international financial markets and want to raise their 
market valuation and establish good reputations. However, overall, corporate governance in a 
typical Russian company remains at a rather low level. Firms’ ownership structures are still 
very concentrated and companies attract little external funds. The unwillingness of 
                                                 
20  Corporate governance rankings of Russian firms are currently provided by Standard and Poor’s, an 
investment bank Troika Dialog, and two nonprofit entities: the Russian Institute of Directors and the Institute of 
Corporate Law and Governance. S&P also produces the Transparency and Disclosure index. 
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controlling shareholders to sell part of their stakes in exchange for external finance seriously 
hampers economic development. 
The challenges facing the Russian system of corporate governance are poor law 
enforcement, growing state intervention in business, and public distrust in the outcomes of 
privatizations. Overall, as property rights remain poorly protected, the “tradition” of 
expropriation – both by private parties and by the state – remains very strong in Russia. This 
discourages any kind of investment in developing private businesses, undermines incentives 
to improve corporate governance, and leads many firms to prefer obscure control and 
financial structures.21 
Recent and proposed legal reforms can alleviate the problem of insecure property rights. 
However, fighting corruption and changing public and government attitudes towards 
privatization deals are crucial steps in the development of a sound corporate governance 
system. 
 
7. Appendix. Legal framework and legal reforms. 
 
The laws that are relevant for corporate governance are: Law on Joint-Stock Companies, 
Civil Code, Law on Securities Market, Law on Investor Protection, Bankruptcy Law and Tax 
Law. 
The most relevant law is the Federal Law on Joint-Stock Companies (JSC Law). A recent 
important initiative of the FFMS is the introduction of the code of corporate conduct (the 
Code hereafter), which is supposed to serve as a complement to the JSC Law. Though 
compliance with the Code is voluntary, Russian stock exchanges require compliance with 
either the whole code or a part of it, depending on the Tier. 
First, we outline the main features of the JSC Law. 
 
7.1. Law on Joint Stock Companies. 
 
Russia’s “Federal Law on Joint Stock Companies” was transplanted from the Anglo-Saxon 
system with adaptations made in consideration of the Russian environment (Black et al 
                                                 
21  One of the ways in which this problem manifests itself is the phenomenon of pre-IPO greenmail that 
sometimes happens in Russia. Preparations for going public include making the firm transparent, but once there 
is transparency, greenmailers make use of the revealed information to attack the company. 
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(1999)). It was introduced in 1995. The law defines the legal status of joint stock companies, 
procedures for establishing and liquidation of JSC, rights and liabilities of shareholders, and 
the governance structure of JSCs. The Law on JSC was amended in 1996, 1999, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2006. Initially, the emphasis of the law was on minority shareholder 
protection, and the law had continued to develop in this direction until recently. However, 
recent abuses of the minority protection provisions in corporate conflicts have led the 
legislators to develop proposals that limit certain rights of minority shareholders. At the same 
time, these proposals are accompanied by plans to increase the liability of directors/managers, 
demand more transparency and control of self-interested transactions, institute class-action 
suits, and encourage paying dividends (see subsection 7.2 below). 
The most important provisions protecting minority shareholders are: 
a) protection against dilution: 
• decisions on large issuances of ordinary shares (more than 25% of the already 
placed ordinary shares) placed under open subscription are under the competence 
(jurisdiction?) of the general shareholders’ meeting (Art. 39); according to the amendments 
of 2002, such decisions should be approved by ¾ of voices (votes?) (instead of simple 
majority in previous version); 
• provision of shareholders with the pre-emptive right of purchasing additionally 
issued shares to be placed under open subscription and in some cases (e.g. a shareholder did 
not participate in the shareholders’ meeting or voted against the decision) under closed 
subscription (Art.40); 
• introduction of “partial” shares, allowing to avoid dilution of minority 
shareholders’ stakes in case of reorganization of a company or consolidation of shares (Art. 
25); 
• provision of shareholders who did not vote or voted against a split-up or spin-off 
decision with the right to obtain proportionate stakes in companies resulting from 
reorganization (Art.18 and 19); 
b) rights of minority shareholders in governing the company: 
• provision of 2%-shareholders with the right to propose any number of questions 
for the annual shareholders’ meeting agenda (Art. 53); 
• provision of 2%-shareholders with the right to include their candidates into the list 
of candidates for the election of governing bodies at both the annual and extraordinary 
shareholders’ meetings (Art. 53); 
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• provision of 10%-shareholders with the right to demand that an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting is called and to call the meeting in case the board of directors ignores or 
refuses the demand (Art. 55). 
c) election of directors and protection against self-dealing transactions: 
• cumulative voting for the election of members of the board of directors (Art. 66); 
• provision of any shareholder with the right to demand a buyout of his share by the 
company in the case of reorganization, large transaction, or changes in the company’s charter 
that diminish their rights, if the shareholder voted against or did not participate in voting (Art. 
75); 
• any transaction in which a manager, director or a large shareholder (20% +) has 
“interest” must be approved by the majority of either non-interested directors (the majority of 
non-interested independent directors if the number of the company’s shareholders is greater 
than 1000) or the majority of non-interested shareholders depending on the type and size of 
the transaction (Art. 83); 
d) access to courts for obtaining redress for a director’s/manager’s misconduct: 
• provision of any shareholder with the right to appeal in court against a decision of 
the shareholder meeting that was taken in violation of the law or the company’s charter in 
case the shareholder did not participate in the meeting or voted against the decision and this 
decision infringed upon his rights and interests; 
• provision of 1%-shareholders with the right to sue a director/manager on behalf of 
the company for damages caused to the company by the director’s/manager’s misconduct or 
inaction (Art. 71); 
• provision of any shareholder with the right to sue a director/manager for damages 
caused to the shareholder by the director’s/manager’s misconduct or inaction in the situations 
described in Art. 84 of the new redaction of the Law on JSC (“acquisition of more than 30% 
of a company’s stock”, see subsection 7.2 below) (Art. 71). 
  
Competence of shareholder meetings: 
Apart from decisions on additional issues of 25% of shares, other decisions that 
require 75% of votes at shareholder meetings are: introduction of changes in the corporate 
charter, decisions on reorganization or liquidation of a company, and decisions on major 
transactions in excess of 50% of the balance sheet value of current assets of a company. 
Other decisions, placed by the Law under the competence of shareholder meetings, require 
 36
50% of votes for approval. These include: election and dismissal of the members of the board 
of directors, increase (if less than 25%) and reduction of the charter capital, establishment of 
the management body, approval of financial reports of a company, and others. 
 
7.2. Recent and planned amendments to the legislation. 
 
On July 1, 2006 a number of amendments to the Law on JSC took effect. There are two 
principal amendments (both are introduced by Art. 84 of the new redaction (revision?)). The 
first introduces detailed rules that describe the procedures and set out the rights and 
obligations of parties in a situation where an acquirer of a firm crosses ownership thresholds 
of 30, 50, and 75% of voting shares and preferred shares with vested voting rights. In short, if 
a person is willing to acquire more than 30% of such shares he may make a voluntary tender 
offer to other shareholders with a price set at the acquirer’s discretion. If the 30% threshold 
was crossed, but (OK?) not in the process a voluntary tender offer, the acquirer is obliged to 
make a mandatory tender offer to all the other security holders. To ensure that they are 
treated fairly, the price of shares set by the acquirer in such an offer must not be lower than 
the maximum of two values: the average market price of shares over the last 6 months22 and 
the price at which the acquirer has bought or committed to buy shares during the last 6 
months (if this is the case).23 (For clarity, can you add a summing-up sentence here as you do 
at the end of the next paragraph?) 
The second amendment introduces the mechanisms of buyouts of securities from minority 
shareholders. Upon crossing a threshold of 95% of shares by a controlling shareholder, the 
remaining security holders may require the acquirer to purchase their voting shares and 
securities convertible into voting shares (minority put option) or the acquirer may require the 
remaining security holders to sell such securities to him (minority squeeze out). This 
amendment also contains minimum price requirements that are supposed to ensure that 
“squeezed out” minority shareholders receive adequate compensation. The amendment, thus, 
allows controlling shareholders to get rid of potential conflicts with greenmailers and raiders 
by simply becoming a sole owner of the firm. 
In addition to the reforms already enacted, the Ministry for Economic Development and 
Trade has developed a thorough plan of reforming Russian corporate law called “The 
                                                 
22 If the shares of the company have not been traded on a stock exchange for the last 6 month, the market price is 
to be determined by an independent appraiser. 
23 The same applies to crossing 50 and 75% thresholds. 
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conception of developing the corporate legislation for the period until 2008”. This plan 
contains a number of proposals that form a basis for legislative changes that are supposed to 
be enacted mostly during 2007.  The plan includes four broad areas for reform that are 
presented and detailed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. MEDT’s plan of reforming corporate legislation  
Area of reform  Main planned changes 
Prevention and resolution of corporate 
conflicts 
- restricting any judicial resolution of 
corporate disputes only to arbitrage 
courts located in the place where the 
company is situated; 
- limiting the use of guaranteeing 
arrangements by courts; 
- ensuring disclosure of information 
about a court hearing that is planned to 
be or has been initiated; 
- introducing preliminary judicial control 
of extraordinary shareholder meetings, 
initiated by minority shareholders; 
- reducing the length of the statute of 
limitations on invalidating decisions of 
a company’s governing bodies; 
- reducing the length of the statute of 
limitations on invalidating registration 
of legal entities and changes in their 
constituent instruments; 
- limiting the scope for registration of 
legal entities based on of false 
documents; 
- limiting the scope for manipulations 
with a shareholder registry; 
Improvement of the structure, sharing of 
responsibilities and liabilities of companies’ 
- providing companies with the choice 
between a one-tier and two-tier board of 
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governance bodies directors; 
- limiting the maximum term of office for 
boards of directors to 3 years; 
- clarifying the notion of an independent 
director and criteria of independence 
and establishing the procedure for 
electing independent directors; 
- introducing the concept of fiduciary 
duty, increasing liability of members of 
governing bodies, introducing the 
possibility of a director to pass liability 
to a person whose directions the former 
had to follow; 
- instituting class-action shareholder 
suits; 
- At the same time, in order to prevent 
abuses of rights by minority 
shareholders, increasing requirements 
for bringing derivative suits (e.g. 
through setting a minimal ownership 
requirement); 
- preventing participation of individuals 
in taking decisions on transactions in 
which they have conflicts of interest, 
mandatory disclosure of the nature and 
degree of any interest in a transaction; 
- mandatory disclosure of individual 
managerial remuneration and 
managerial ownership; 
- qualifying principles according to 
which a self-interested transaction or a 
large transaction can be invalidated; 
- clarifying rules that determine whether 
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a person has to be considered 
“interested” in a transaction; 
- stimulating dividend payments through 
reducing taxes on the part of profits that 
is allocated for dividends, eliminating 
taxation of dividends paid by a 
company to another company belonging 
to the same business group. 
Amendment of the system of legal forms of 
business and non-for-profit organizations 
- instituting a single legal form of a joint-
stock company (instead of two that 
currently exist: closed and open joint-
stock company), joint-stock companies 
should only differ in whether their 
shares are available for public trading 
or not; 
- instituting shareholder agreements; 
- relaxing regulations regarding chartered 
capital; 
Developing legislation regulating 
reorganization and functioning of business 
groups 
- a number of changes regarding 
reorganization of companies; 
- renunciation of the principle according 
to which a parent company can exert no 
influence on its subsidiary (unless 
specified in a formal agreement or the 
subsidiary’s charter) and bears no 
liability in case of the subsidiary’s 
bankruptcy (except if there was intent 
in the parent company’s actions that led 
to the bankruptcy); 
- limiting cross-holding of shares 
between companies in a group; 
- introducing consolidated accounting 
statements for business groups 
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(satisfying IAS); 
- considering a business group as a single 
taxpayer regardless of the number of 
firms belonging to the group; 
- qualifying criteria according to which a 
person can be considered “affiliated”, 
depending on a particular situation. 
 
7.3. Brief description of the Code of Corporate Conduct 
 
The introduction to the Code states: “Corporate governance is a term that encompasses a 
variety of activities connected with the management of companies. Corporate governance 
affects the performance of economic entities and their ability to attract the capital required for 
economic growth. Improvement of corporate governance in the Russian Federation is vital 
for increasing investment in all sectors of the Russian economy from both domestic sources 
and foreign investors. One means to foster such improvement is to introduce standards that 
are based on an analysis of best practices of corporate governance.”  
“These standards of corporate governance apply to all economic entities, but are most 
important for joint stock companies. This is because it is in joint stock companies that the 
separation between ownership and management is the greatest, and thus conflicts related to 
corporate governance are most likely. Therefore, this Code has been developed primarily for 
joint stock companies seeking access to capital markets. This consideration, however, does 
not rule out the possibility of its use by other economic entities.” 
“Standards of corporate governance should be applied to ensure adequate protection of 
the interests of all shareholders, regardless of the size of their holdings. The greater the level 
of shareholders' protection achieved, the more investment capital will be available to Russian 
joint stock companies (hereinafter referred to as "companies"), which will favorably 
influence the Russian economy as a whole.” 
“Standards of corporate governance should be instrumental to the attainment of high 
ethical standards in relations between market participants.” 
The Code establishes the following principles of corporate governance:  
1. Corporate conduct practices should effectively enable shareholders to exercise their 
rights associated with participation in a company. 
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2. Corporate conduct practices should secure equal treatment of shareholders owning 
equal numbers of shares of the same type (category). Equal protection should be secured for 
all shareholders if their rights are infringed upon. 
3. Corporate conduct practices should secure strategic management of company 
operations by the board of directors and efficient control by the board of directors over the 
activities of executive bodies of a company, as well as accountability of the members of the 
board of directors of a company to shareholders thereof. 
4. Corporate conduct practices should enable executive bodies of a company to exercise 
efficient management of company operations in a reasonable manner, in good faith and solely 
in the interests of a company, and should secure accountability of executive bodies of the 
company to the board of directors of a company and shareholders thereof. 
5. Corporate conduct practices should secure timely disclosure of full and accurate 
information about the company, including its financial position, performance, ownership and 
management structures in order to enable shareholders and investors of a company to take 
reasonable decisions. 
6. Corporate conduct practices should take into account statutory rights of parties 
concerned, including company employees, and encourage active cooperation between the 
company and the parties for the purpose of increasing the net worth of the company, the 
value of its shares and other securities, and of creating jobs. 
7. Corporate conduct practices should secure efficient control over business and financial 
operations of a company for the purpose of protecting rights and lawful interests of 
shareholders. 
In addition, the code provides detailed recommendations on the following issues: 
• A general meeting of shareholders: calling and preparation of a meeting, agenda, 
procedures for conducting a meeting, voting procedures; 
• A board of directors: its responsibilities, formation, members, independent directors, 
organization of board of directors’ activities, remuneration of directors; 
• Executive bodies of the company (management board, general director), authority and 
responsibilities, members, formation, organization of activities, remuneration, 
answerability; 
• Major deals, reorganizations: definition, procedures; 
• Disclosure of information about a company: goals, forms, provision of information to 
shareholders, auditing, an auditing committee; 
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• Dividends: setting the amount, distribution procedures; 
• Settlement of corporate disputes. 
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